Continental and sub-continental income inequality by Heshmati, Almas
 




	

		


  
	
 	!
!"	#

Heshmati, A. 
  
	

	
	
	
 
Almas Heshmati 
MTT Economic Research 
Luutnantintie 13 
FIN-00410 Helsinki, Finland 
Phone: +358-9-56086213 
Fax:     +358-9-56086264 
E-mail: Almas.Heshmati@mtt.fi 
 
August 16, 2004 
 

Income inequality can be measured at different levels of aggregation such as global, 
continental, international and national levels. Here we consider income inequality at 
regions defined as equivalent of continental and sub-continental levels. We investigate 
the economic disparity between regions of the world and among countries within each 
continent or sub-continent. The empirical results for data availability reasons are mainly 
based on the second half of the 20th century. The review covers a whole range of 
measures and methods frequently employed in empirical analysis of the global and 
regional income inequality and income distribution. Different determinant factors along 
with quantification of their impacts are presented and empirical results from different 
case studies are discussed. Finally, these results are contrasted to those obtained based 
on the WIID covering the same period and group of countries.   
 Income inequality, inequality indices, income distribution, continents, 
regions.  
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It is well known that inequality is multidimensional. Economists are concerned 
specifically with the economic or monetarily measurable dimension related to incomes. 
Inequality can be linked to for instance skills, education, opportunities, happiness, 
health, life expectancy, welfare, assets and social mobility.1 This paper focuses on 
income inequality referring to the inequality of the distribution of individuals, 
household or some per capita measure of income. Lorenz Curve is used for analysing 
the size distribution of income. It plots the cumulative share of total income against the 
cumulative proportion of income receiving units. The divergence of a Lorenz curve for 
a given income distribution to Lorenz curve for perfect equality is measured by some 
index of inequality. The most widely used index of inequality is the Gini coefficient. 
Among the other measures of inequality are: the range, the variance, the squared 
coefficient of variation, the variance of log incomes, the absolute and relative mean 
deviations, and Theil’s two inequality indices. For reviews of inequality see 
Subramanian (1997), Cowell (2000) and Heshmati (2004a). 
The empirical literature on economic inequality is growing as a result of increasing 
interest in measuring and understanding the level, causes and development of income 
inequality and poverty and availability of income distribution data. In 1990s there was a 
shift in research previously focused on economic growth, determinants of economic 
growth and convergence in per capita incomes across countries to analysis of 
distribution of income, its development over time and identification of factors 
determining the distribution of income and poverty reductions.2 Empirical results shows 
tendency for income per capita to converge, and an increase in inequality in the 
distribution of personal income in particular in many developing and transition 
countries. Availability of household surveys has been improved and several 
standardized databases have been created. These allow analysis of income distribution 
at the most disaggregate individual or per capita household levels. Income distribution 
is otherwise often analyzed at three levels of aggregation, namely global, international 
and national3. Income inequality can also be measured at a within-country regional 
                                                           
1 Heshmati (2004b) reviews the recent advances in the measurement of inequality and gives attention to 
the relationship between income and non-income dimensions of inequality. 
2 Quah (2002), Ravallion (2003), Sala-i-Martin (2002a) analysed convergence in income inequality, while 
Acemoglu and Ventura (2002), Atkinson (1997), Bourguignon and Morrisson (2002), Gottschalk and 
Smeeding (1997) and Milanovic (2002) focus on the distribution of income. Acemoglu (2002), Caminada 
and Goudswaard (2001), Cornia and Kiiski (2001), Gotthschalk and Smeeding (2000), Milanovic (2002), 
O’Rourke (2001), Park (2001), Sala-i-Martin (2002b) and Schultz (1998) studied trends in income 
inequality. 
3 Global or world income inequality refers to inequality differences between all individuals in the world 
(Milanovic 2002; Schultz 1998; Quah 1999; Bourguignon and Morrisson 2002; Sala-i-Martin 2002a), 
while international income inequality refers to the economic disparity between countries (Acemoglu 
2002; Cornia and Kiiski 2001; Gothscalk and Smeeding 1997; and Milanovic 2001). At the intra-national 
level inequality refers to the distribution of income among people within individual countries (Cameron 
2000a; Cowell, Ferreira and Lichtfield 1998; Gustafsson and Shi 2002; Liebbrandt, Woolard and Woolard 
2000). Studies of continents or regions include: transition economies (Ivaschenko 2002, Wan 2002), East 
Asian countries (Kakwani and Krogkaew 2000 and You 1998), the European Union (Belbo and Knaus 
2001, Gothschalk and Smeeding 2000), Latin American countries (LondoNo and Szekely 2000, Wood 
1997) and sub-Saharan African countries (Milanovic and Yitzhaki 2001, Svedborg 2002). 
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level4. The international and national income inequality is beyond the scope of this 
paper. This issue is reviewed in Heshmati (2004c). 
Different parametric and non-parametric methods have been developed to decompose 
inequality and changes in poverty. Inequality is decomposed by sub-groups, income 
sources, causal factors and by other income unit characteristics. Inequality can also be 
decomposed at different levels of aggregation. For instance at the national level it can 
be decomposed into within-subgroup and between-subgroups. In similar way at the 
international level inequality can be decomposed into within-country and between-
country components.5 Income inequality, in addition to the levels mentioned above it 
can be measured at the continental and sub-continental levels where one examines both 
between and within economic or geographic regions. There is evidence that poverty and 
inequality has developed differently between and within regions. Here the focus is on 
inequality in income distribution within and between geographic and economic regions. 
Such analysis can reveal effects of openness, convergence due to factor mobility, and 
may also indicate regional polarization, or disintegration and widening inequality driven 
by structural differences between regions. Furthermore it is important to consider 
heterogeneity in income inequality in both level and development over time among the 
countries within a region. 
Data availability of household surveys has improved in the regions such as former 
Soviet Union, Eastern Europe and Africa. Several standardized databases have been 
created. These data cover mainly the second half of the twentieth century. This review 
aims to cover empirical analysis of continental or regional income inequality and 
income distribution. We discuss the benefit and limitations of this approach compared 
to the global and international levels and present empirical results found in the literature 
and those obtained based on the World Income Inequality Database (WIID) covering 
almost the same period and group of countries. Research on the world income 
inequality increase awareness of the problem, its measurement and quantification, 
identification of causal factors and of policy measures to reduce the within and between 
continents income inequality. 
Rest of the paper is organised as follows. In section 2 the WIID database is described. 
Section 3 and 4 are on inter-regional and intra-regional income inequalities. The regions 
based on available studies include Eastern Europe and former USSR, Scandinavian, 
Western Europe, OECD countries, small and medium sized developing countries, sub-
Saharan Africa, Latin America, East Asia, South Asia, South-East Asia and Pacific. The 
final Section summarises the reviews and empirical results. 

*)+

The data used here are obtained from the WIDER World Income Inequality Database 
(WIID) which is an expanded version of the Deininger and Squire (1996) database. 
WIID contains information on income inequality, income shares, and a number of 
                                                           
4 Recent such studies focus on large countries like China (Xu and Zou 2000; Gustafsson and Shi 2002), 
Russia (Luttmer 2001; Fedorov 2002), India (Jha 2000; Datt and Ravallion 1992) and the USA (Patridge, 
Rickman and Levernier 1996; Moffitt and Gothschalk 2002). For a recent review see Heshmati (2004d). 
5 The measurement and decomposition of inequalities is beyond the scope of this paper. For recent 
reviews see Shorrocks and Wan (2003) and Heshmati (2004a and 2004b). 
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variables indicating the source of data, and the quality classification for 146 existing 
industrialized, developing and transition countries6. The countries are observed on an 
irregular basis mainly covering the period post 1950 until 1998. To avoid distortions for 
graphing the trend in global and regional inequality over time we have truncated the 
data at 1950. The number of the excluded observations covering 1867-1949 is only 25 
or 1.5% of the sample.  
The Gini coefficient is measured in percentage points. It is the mean of multiple 
observations for a country in a given year. The multiplicity of observations is due to 
differences in income definitions, data sources, reference units, and the population 
coverage. The population adjusted Gini coefficient is also reported. However, the 
population adjusted Gini measure is very sensitive to the exit and entry of countries 
with large populations like China and India.  
To provide a better picture of the distribution of inequality we report the first, the last, 
the period range and the number of years a country is observed. In addition to the mean 
Gini coefficient, the median minimum, the maximum, the standard deviation, the range 
and the annual changes in Gini coefficient are provided for individual countries grouped 
by the regional location in Table 3. In Table 4 we report the Gini coefficient and the 
population weighted Gini coefficient together with the distribution of income. The 
decile observations are transformed to quintile income shares to make the income 
distribution comparable across countries and over time. As a second measure of 
inequality the ratio of the highest to the lowest quintiles are calculated and reported in 
Table 4.  
  
,)-		
The relative high degree of homogeneity in the economic development within regions 
combined with a high degree of heterogeneity between regions makes analysis of the 
inter-regional inequality an interesting dimension to be explored. Maddison (2001) 
using data on GDP across countries and over time reports a steady increase in the inter-
regional inequalities since 1870. As a measure of the regional dispersion the ratio of 
income per head of the richest to the poorest region of the world is used. The ratio has 
increased from 5:1 in 1870 to 19:1 in 1998. There is, however, evidence of substantial 
convergence and divergence patterns across regions. In addition to income ratios 
Maddison uses income share as a second measure to compare regions of the world. The 
global GDP share of the Western off-shoots (US, Canada, Australia and New Zealand) 
increased from 10.2 per cent in 1870 to 30.6 per cent in 1950. It declined to 25.1 per 
cent in 1998. The Western Europe share of the global GDP decreased from 33.6 per 
cent to 20 per cent during the same period. Similar decrease was observed in the case of 
Latin America from 8.7 per cent to 2.5 per cent, while the Africa’s share remained 
constant at around 3.0-3.5 per cent. The Asia’s share declined prior to 1952 but it 
increased from 18.5 per cent in 1973 to 37.2 per cent in 1998. The Eastern Europe and 
the former USSR enjoyed a constant share of the world GDP in the range of 11-13 per 
cent until 1973. Thereafter this region experienced a decline from 12.9 per cent in 1973 
to 5.3 per cent in 1998. It is to be noted that in the case of the GDP shares no correction 
for changes in the population size or the purchasing power parity is made. The decline 
                                                           
6 The WIID data originally contains 151 countries. The number of countries in our analysis differs due to 
the disintegration of the Soviet Union, Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia, and reunification of Germany. 
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in the shares is reflecting negative relative changes in the shares in total and not 
necessarily declines in the absolute Global GDP levels. 
Maddison’s two measures only account for the level differences between regions. They 
neglect the distributional inequality within regions. Milanovic (2002) derives the world 
income or the expenditure distribution of individuals for 1988 and 1993 based on the 
household data from 91 countries and adjusted for PPP between countries. The data has 
a high coverage. It covers 84 per cent of the world population and 93 per cent of the 
world GDP. Inequality measured by Gini coefficient increased from 0.63 in 1988 to 
0.66 in 19937. The increase is attributed by 75-88 per cent to inter-country rather than 
intra-country differences in the mean income. The main contributors were from the 
rising urban-rural differences in China, the slow growth in the rural South Asia and the 
declining income in the transition countries. The estimated Gini coefficients in 1988 and 
1993 by regions are: Africa 0.43 and 0.47, Asia 0.56 and 0.62, Latin America and 
Caribbean 0.57 and 0.56, Eastern Europe and USSR 0.26 and 0.46 and Western Europe, 
North America and Oceania 0.37 and 0.37, respectively. Despite the benefits concerning 
the high coverage and the disaggregation level of data, the period is short covering only 
late 80s and early 90s. Thus, the direction of changes might not be representative for the 
true long-run changes in the regional income inequality, but extreme observations, 
measurement errors, or differences in definitions and sources of income.    
The data described above is extended in Milanovic (2001) to 126 countries over the last 
50 years. Three different concepts of the world or international inequality are defined: 
the unweighted countries’ GDP per capita, the population weighted GDPs per capita, 
and a combination of the international and internal country income distributions. Using 
the above concepts and based on income or expenditures calculated from household 
surveys, the world income distribution is derived. The unweighted measure shows an 
increasing global inequality over time driven by the development in Latin America, 
Eastern Europe and Africa. The population-weighted measure indicates a declining 
inequality driven mostly by China’s fast growth during the last two decades. The 
increasing inequality by the third combined concept is attributed to the fast growth and 
the rising urban/rural differences in China, the slower growth in the rural Asia and the 
declining income in transition economies. The longer time period and better country 
coverage together with the adjustment for population by Milanovic improves the quality 
of analysis significantly.  
Dikhanov and Ward (2002) using data from a sample of 46 countries for the period 
1970 to 1999 find that the absolute number of the poor, broadly defined, increased and 
the global income distribution became less equal. The regional structure has undergone 
major changes during the period of the study reflecting the unprecedented economic 
performance of China and the economic progress in India. Despite the sample contains 
large countries like India and China and cover a period of significant development in 
those two countries, it is too small to serve as a basis for making an inference about the 
development of income distribution at the global level. The picture provided is partial 
rather than global.  
Deininger and Squire (1998) used country data for 108 countries during 1960-1992 on 
distributions of income and land. Similar to Milanovic (2002) it is recommended that 
inequality analysis should preferably be based on the household data with a 
                                                           
7 The two periods of 1988 and 1993 are not exact. They cover surveys collected around those two periods. 
 6
comprehensive coverage of sources of income and being representative of population. 
Deininger and Squire showed that: there is a strong negative relationship between the 
initial inequality in land and the long-term growth. Inequality reduces income growth 
for the poor, and there is little support for the Kuznets hypothesis. Growth and 
inequality are affected by the redistribution of assets and the increased aggregate 
investment. A comparison of decadal medians of the Gini coefficient for the income 
distributions by regions during the period 1960-1990 demonstrates a large variation in 
inequality between regions. It is the highest in Latin America (0.50-0.53) and the sub-
Saharan Africa (0.40-0.50) and lowest in Eastern Europe (0.22-0.29), but increasing 
over time during the transition period in the latter case.  
Parker and Gardner (2002) used seven different approaches8 including three transition 
matrices and measures, three changes in raw incomes and one inequality reduction 
principle to measure the international income mobility. Income mobility analysis is 
concerned with measuring changes in the economic status of individuals and 
movements of their incomes over time. The measure based on the income inequality 
principle proposed by Shorrocks (1978b) uses the arithmetic mean incomes 
corresponding to two different periods. The results using GDP per capita from 106 
countries divided into five regions9 for the years 1972, 1982 and 1992 indicate that 
1982-1992 period to be more mobile than the 1972-1982 period. An increase in 
mobility counteracts the rise in the international income inequality. Mobility is 
characterised as small transitory movements and takes place in the middle deciles of the 
distribution. Tropical Africa is the next mobile region, but unlike the North region most 
of the observed income changes there were negative.  
The interregional income inequality derived from the WIID where the sample countries 
(146) are divided into 9 regions is reported in Table 1 and the distribution of income by 
quintiles in Table 2. The results show a significant interregional heterogeneity. Here we 
define heterogeneity as the standard deviation of the Gini coefficient. The highest rate is 
found to be associated with the sub-Saharan Africa (10.05 per cent) and Middle East 
and North Africa (8.23 per cent), while a low dispersion is observed in South East Asia 
(5.87 per cent), South Asia (5.375), and Eastern Europe (5.06 per cent). The variation 
despite the comprehensive redistribution systems is unexpectedly high in the 
industrialised countries (7.90 per cent). The dispersion and ranges between minimum 
and maximum Gini values are highly correlated. Sub-Saharan Africa and Latin America 
again display the lowest levels of income (0.06 and 0.04) allocated to the first quintile 
of the population and the highest share to the highest quintile (0.52 and 0.54), 
respectively. With the exception of Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Republics, the 
variation in inequality within regions is stable or declining over time. South East Asia 
and South Asia show the least dispersion within region (see Figures 1-9). However, the 
development of inequality in Latin America, Eastern Europe and the former Soviet 
Republics show increasing trends post 1970s (see Figure 10).  
                                                           
8 The transition matrices and measures include Bartholomew (1982), Shorrocks (1978a) and Parker and 
Rougier (2001). The measures based on changes in raw incomes include King (1983), Fields and Ok 
(1996 and 1999). Finally the measure based on the inequality reduction principle is based on Shorrocks 
(1978b). For alternative mobility measures see also Zandvakili (1999). 
9 The five regions are North (23), South (9), Tropical America (23), Tropical Asia (18) and Tropical 
Africa (33). The numbers in parenthesis are number of countries in each region. 
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To sum up there are a number of measures traditionally used in studies of the inter-
regional income inequality. The ratio of income per head of the richest to the poorest 
region of the world is one such measure. The ratio has increased over time and results 
show evidence of both convergence and divergence among the regions. A second 
measure is the regions’ GDP share of the global income. Different regions’ share has 
developed differently over time. A third, measure is based on the Gini coefficient of 
income inequality. The focus is on its variations across regions and its regional 
development over time. Several studies indicate that the Gini coefficient has increased. 
A fourth measure is based on the development of the absolute number of poor. The 
number of poor has declined but its regional concentration has increased. Land 
distribution and redistribution of assets are a fifth measure of inequality. A sixth 
measure is based on income mobility that counteracts increasing income inequality. A 
seventh measure is computed based on the ratio of the regions highest to lowest quintile 
share of income.  
Regardless of the chosen measure when applicable the transformation of income to PPP 
and its adjustment for the population size, the coverage in terms of the number of 
countries and their populations share are important factors affecting the development of 
the inter-regional inequality in the world. Several studies prefer the use of the household 
data with comprehensive coverage of income sources and representative population. 
Results based on WIID database show a large interregional heterogeneity in both the 
level and the development of income distribution and income inequality over time. The 
inequality in Latin America, Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Republics show 
increasing trends post 1970s.             

.)-		
Intra-regional inequality refers to disparity in the income distribution within a 
geographical region consisting of a number of countries which may or may not be 
members of an economic union. Here we review a few recent studies on each 
geographical region. The regional classification differs from that used to group 
countries based on the WIID database or the classifications found in international data 
sources. Thus, the review here is based on a less standardized classification employed 
by individual researchers in the inequality literature to group countries into different 
regions. In many cases regions overlap or countries across two or more regions are 
compared to each other. We use the concepts of region, continent and sub-continents 
interchangeably. The regional income inequality within a selection of large countries is 
reviewed in Heshmati (2004d).   
.)("#$/#"0 %
The transformation process of Eastern Europe from planned economies to market 
economies has been the focus of attention of many researchers. Milanovic (1998) is 
concerned with the social dimensions of the transition to market economies in the 
Central and the Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union. The main emphasis is on 
the incidence of poverty in the transition economies. Here GDP per capita and the 
income inequality across the region are used as a backdrop to the poverty analysis. The 
state of inequality and poverty during the period before transition 1987-1993 is 
compared with the transition period during 1993-1996. Using data including 18 of the 
region’s 27 countries it is shown that poverty has increased greatly across the region as 
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a result of the combined decline in real incomes and the increased income inequality. 
Nine countries were excluded because of the effects of shocks due to the internal and 
external military conflicts. Empirical results show that while the real incomes have 
declined across the region, inequality has not increased everywhere and 
homogeneously. The wage distribution and the failure in the welfare transfer system 
might have caused the increase in the income inequality. Milanovic and Yitzhaki (2001) 
using data from 22 transition economies for 1988 and 1999 found that 61 per cent of the 
overall inequality is associated with the within country inequality. The high and 
increasing within country inequality contrary to many studies, which expect a positive 
relationship between democracy and equality contradicts the existence of such 
relationship (Gradstein and Milanovic 2002). The WIID data show significant variations 
in the mean inequality over the region. The Russian Federation, Georgia and Kyrgyze 
Republics, Estonia and the republics that engaged in conflicts experienced a high 
inequality (see Table 3, Section 7).   
A combination of a number of existing linear, log linear and reciprocal models to an 
exponential model proposed by Ram (1995) is used by Wan (2002) to analyse the 
relationship between income inequality and the growth in transition economies: 
(1) εββββ +++−−−= 24321 )exp())exp(1(   
where  is measured by an indicator like the Gini coefficient,  is level of 
development like 	 per capita,  is some transformation variable (linear, 
logarithmic, or reciprocal) of the development, and ε  a random error term. Using data 
on 24 transition economies Wan finds a positive inequality growth relationship. 
However, the results indicate that rising inequality is neither a part of the inevitable 
Kuznets curve, nor a part of the empirical regularity found by Barro (2000). Barro finds 
little overall relation between income inequality and the rates of growth and investment. 
Higher inequality tends to retard the growth in poor countries and encourages the 
growth in richer countries. In parallel to the rising inequality and the variation in the 
observed inequality levels in the transition economies spending on education has 
declined. Aghion and Commander (1999) simulate the effects of such education policy 
choices on the path of inequality over the transition. The Kuznets curve representation 
does not apply. They show how trade liberalization and technological and 
organizational changes affect the relative demand for types of labour resulting in an 
increase in inequality. Persistent of inequality is expected to depend on the pace of skill 
acquisition and on the evolution of the educational system. Policies raising the quality 
of education dampen the increase in wage inequality. For explanations of the observed 
increase in the between-group and the within-group wage inequality in the developed 
countries over the past thirty years in association with the transition to the new 
technological paradigm and the application of growth enhancing policies (in education 
and training) see Aghion (2002).     
Ivaschenko (2002) investigates the causes of the unprecedented changes in the income 
distribution and the dramatic increase in the income inequality facing the transitional 
economies of Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union in the 1990s. Panel data from 
24 transitional countries for the period 1989-1998 is used in a regression analysis: 
(2) 
     
 εβ ++= ∑
=1  
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The subscripts , , and  denote country, period and inequality determinant () 
variables. The aim is to identify and to estimate the impacts of a number of potential 
determinants of the rising inequality. These determinants are per capita GDP, economic 
liberalisation, privatisation and deindustrialization, hyperinflation, unemployment and 
the size of government consumption, civil conflict, political rights and civil liberties. 
Inequality is measured by the Gini coefficient obtained from the WIID. In the base 
model specification variations in the Gini coefficient is explained by it determinants 
including per capita GDP, its square, inflation rate, unemployment rate, the general 
government consumption, industry value added as percentage of GDP, and the private 
sector share of GDP. The results support a U-shaped relationship between income 
inequality and per capita GDP. The relationship between income inequality and growth 
is positive for the Eastern Europe and negative for the former Soviet Union republics. 
Hyperinflation, civil conflict and unemployment increase inequality. Economic 
liberalisation, privatisation and deindustrialization have also contributed to the rise in 
income inequality. Alexeev and Leitzel (2001) demonstrate that the state-sector queue 
rationing and price controls are preferable to the imperfectly targeted income subsidies 
in providing a social-safety net to counteract the rapid changes in the relative well being 
during transition.  
In examining the problem of ensuring health-care coverage to rural and poor areas of 
the developing countries Luttmer (2001) decomposes the total income into transitory 
and persistent components. Luttmer measured income as a monthly consumption 
expenditure or an income adjusted for the household size using an equivalent scale. The 
aim is to distinguish the underlying income inequality and changes in poverty from the 
effects due to measurement error or transitory chocks: 
(3)  
      
			 εηαε +++=+=
−
)( * 1,*  
where the log consumption expenditure (	) of individuals over time is function of the 
underlying level of consumption ( *	 ), a transitory shock possibly including 
measurement error (ε ), a time-specific trend (α ), a term representing persistent shocks 
(η ), and i is individual and t time period. The empirical analysis is based on the 
household level data from Poland 1993-1996 and Russia 1994-1998. The results show 
that accounting for noise in the data reduces the inequality measured as Gini coefficient 
by 10-15 per cent. About half of the median absolute annual changes in income or 
spending in Poland (20 per cent) and in Russia (50 per cent) reflect measurement error 
or transitory shocks. Thus suggesting that the underlying levels of income and spending 
are more stable than the data suggests. The high levels of economic mobility were found 
to be largely driven by transitory events and noisy data. Around 80 per cent of the poor 
in these two countries remain in poverty for at least one year. One possible way of 
reducing the negative role of the transitory events and measurement error, which get 
averaged out over the year is to examine the inequality in average incomes10.  
Results based on the WIID database suggest that the dynamics of inequality in the 
transition economies is characterised by an increasing inequality and a large variation in 
inequality levels across transition countries. Prior to 1985 the range of inequality was 
quite small. Both the mean and the range between countries increased substantially (see 
Figures 7 and 8). The increase and dispersion is much higher for the former Soviet 
                                                           
10 Here average incomes are based on the current month, and the last 12, 24 and 36 months ago.   
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republics (7.06 and 34.70) than the Eastern Europe (5.06 and 28.91). The dispersion 
numbers in parenthesis are the standard deviation and ranges of income inequality 
measured as the Gini coefficient. The standard deviation and ranges of inequality over 
time is the highest for the Russian Federation (7.64 and 19.71) among the East 
European countries and the lowest for Macedonian (1.68 and 4.55). In the case of the 
former Soviet republics the highest dispersion is associated with Georgia (12.87 and 
32.80) and the lowest to Tajikistan (3.34 and 8.20). For more details on individual 
countries see Table 3, Sections 7 and 8.  
The discussion above can be summarized as the path of inequality over the transition is 
explained by the differences in the initial conditions, the countries subsequent policy 
choices and key variables like ownership and restructuring programmes. Empirical 
result does not support the Kuznets curve for the transition economies, but confirms the 
association between inequality and growth. The analysis is extended to look at how 
trade liberalisation, technological and organisational change affects the relative demand 
for labour resulting in the rising inequality. Labour market policies, improved 
institutional capacities for taxation and redistribution and policies aimed at rising 
quality of education by rising adaptability are expected to dampen the increase in 
income inequality. 
.)*!##1#
The high quality, comparable and comprehensive household surveys and various public 
service registers in Scandinavia have been accessible to researchers. The excellent data 
situation together with the need for the evaluation of impacts of decades of tax and 
benefit reforms on labour supply, welfare and the inequality between and within 
different income groups have resulted in many single or cross-Scandinavian income 
distribution studies (e.g. Aronsson and Palme 1998, Fellman, Jäntti and Lambert 1999, 
and Maasoumi and Heshmati 2000). A few of such recent studies will be reviewed 
below.  
A two-way causal relationship between income mobility and income inequality can be 
expected. Shorrocks (1978a) introduced as an alternative to the transition matrix 
approach a family of mobility measures that incorporates the relationship between 
mobility and inequality. Mobility is measured as the relative reduction in the weighted 
average of a single-year inequality when the accounting period is extended. The 
opposite state of no mobility is defined to occur when the relative income or rankings of 
individuals are constant over time. Aaberge et al. (2002) compare the income inequality 
and the income mobility based on household data in the Scandinavian (Denmark, 
Norway and Sweden) countries and the US during 1980s. In a somewhat modified 
version of the approach proposed by Shorrocks income mobility (
) is defined as 
function of the Gini coefficient and the overall mean ( µ ) and the means of the 
distribution of income in different years ( µ ): 
(4)  
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Income is measured as earnings, market income and disposable income. The results 
demonstrate that inequality is greater in the US and that the ranking of the countries by 
degree of inequality remains stable when the comparison period is extended to up to 11 
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years, 1980-1990. The period average income inequality is for Denmark 0.22, Norway 
0.26, Sweden 0.23 and the US 0.34. The US has the highest mobility for earnings and 
disposable income, while Sweden seems to be the most income mobile country for 
market income in the sample. However, the results suggest that there is no evidence of a 
positive relationship between inequality and mobility.  
Several country studies focus on the distributional impacts of various policies on the 
welfare of sub-groups. Björklund and Palme (1997) decomposed the overall income 
inequality over 18 years into two parts: one showing the inequality of long-run 
(permanent) income, and a second showing the variability of individual income over 
time. A welfare state affects both components, but the equalising impact on income of 
the group with a low long-run income is higher. Fellman, Jäntti and Lambert (1999) by 
decomposition techniques use inequality impact of optimal policy as a yardstick to 
gauge the effectiveness of tax and benefit policies in reducing inequality in Finland 
1971-1990. In comparison with the distribution of incomes of single immigrants and 
Swedes by various attributes Maasoumi and Heshmati (2000) find that welfare policies 
favour the elderly, females, larger families, and immigrants with longer periods of 
residency. The higher the educational credentials, the higher is the burden of these 
equalisation policies.    
The evolution of the income distribution of a small number of developed countries 
during two centuries is analysed by Morrisson (2000). The use of long time series data 
rather than cross sections is preferred to test the Kuznets inverse U-curve hypothesis. 
Data from the Scandinavian countries (Denmark, Sweden, Finland and Norway), 
Netherlands, Germany and France is used for the purpose. The inverse U-curve 
hypothesis is verified in four (France, Sweden, Germany, and Finland) cases. Using the 
Theil inequality indicator: 
(5) 2211     ++=+=  
is decomposed into between (
 
 ) and within (
 
 ) agricultural () and non-agricultural 
() sectors in each country. The variable  indicates the shares of two sectors in the total 
income. Political (the two World Wars and French revolution) and economic (taxes and 
transfers and government interventions) factors explaining the long-term evolution of 
distribution are discussed. The economic factors playing a key role to the evolution of 
the income distribution are found to be the market structures, the diffusion of education 
and saving, and dualism.   
The concept of convergence in inequality (Benabou 1996) follows the conditional 
convergence of per capita incomes (Mankiew, Romer and Weil 1992). Iacoviello (1998) 
using LIS data including Denmark, Finland, Norway and Sweden investigates whether 
inequality converge to a steady state level of inequality during the process of income 
growth. In addition Iacoviello studies the linkage between the income and inequality 
movements, the factor influencing this growth process, as well as the reverse causation 
from the Gini income inequality to growth. The post-tax Gini coefficient during the 
country specific periods covering 1965-1993 is used to measure income inequality. 
Results show that the shocks to income can yield short run effects on the income 
distribution. However, a reversal link from inequality to income was not observed. 
The pre tax and transfer income inequality among the Scandinavian countries is 
increasing. Analysis of the WIID data shows that the mean inequality is highest in 
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Sweden (38.14 per cent) and the lowest in Finland (29.33 per cent). The corresponding 
for Denmark and Norway are 34.04 per cent and 30.74 per cent, respectively. The 
dispersion measured as standard deviation and range is the highest for Sweden (12.36 
and 35.63) and the lowest for Norway (5.07 and 16.47). The distribution at the tails is 
however different and more equal in Finland and Sweden (see Section 9 of Tables 3 and 
4).  
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The West European region is the single region most intensely studied at different levels 
of aggregation when income distribution is concerned. Ritakallio (2001) studies the 
trends in the income inequality and poverty and the effectiveness of income transfer 
systems between 1980 and 1995 in nine countries in Western Europe, US and Canada. 
These countries represent three11 different ideal types of social policy or welfare state 
models: mean testing (UK, Canada and USA), corporatist (Netherlands, France and 
Germany) and institutional models (Norway, Finland and Sweden). The empirical 
analysis is based on LIS database containing the national household annual income 
(earnings, transfers and income from capital and employment) survey data. The LIS 
data is found to be a reliable starting point for the comparison of welfare states and their 
social policy. Comparisons by Rotakallio are made at three levels: between the 
population sub-groups, between points of time, and between the countries or the welfare 
state models. The analysis of inequality and poverty produced similar picture of the 
differences across the countries and the models of social policy. Income inequality 
measured as the Gini coefficient for earnings is increasing over time. However, the 
income inequality for disposable income in the Nordic countries and Canada has not 
increased over time, while the USA and the UK represent the opposite developments of 
disposable income. The countries are found to be different in their effectiveness in 
reducing poverty and income inequality using income transfer measures. Here poverty 
is defined using the relative income method where poverty line is both country and time 
specific. Poverty line is defined as half of the per capita median annual income. Poverty 
rates (share of the poor in the whole population) and poverty profiles (share of the poor 
in each population category) for the total population and disaggregated by household 
type, number of children, age and labour participation show a large heterogeneity 
among the population sub-groups and the countries.   
Belbo and Knaus (2001) propose an aggregate measure of inequality for the founding12 
countries of the European Monetary Union. The comparison is based on the distribution 
of the total annual household income after taxes and transfer payments from the 
European Community Household Panel and LIS in 1994. The Theil inequality index 
(T1) is used here and inequality is decomposed into the between and the within 
components for different household types within Euroland: 
(6)  ∑ ∑∑
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11 A fourth type of social policy or welfare state model is the basic security model.   
12 The founding countries of the European Monetary Union are: Austria, Belgium, France, Germany, 
Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Portugal and Spain.  
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where 
 
  is income of individual , 

  is the share of total income of sub-group , µ  
and 
 
µ are the mean income of the population () and sub-group . The population sub-
groups are defined based on age and the number of children in each household. Using 
sub-group shares of the total income determine each country’s as well as each group’s 
contribution to the overall income inequality. Results show that the between country 
differences make up 9 per cent of the overall inequality indicating large differences in 
mean income levels across Euro countries. Social transfer payments contribute 
positively to the between country inequality differences and the between-household 
differences make up 2 per cent of the total inequality indicating a homogenous 
distribution of income across demographic groups.  
The overall changes that result when integrating new countries into the existing entity is 
decomposed by Belbo and Knaus into four effects: the direct inequality effect, the 
between group or the mean income effect, and the re-weighting the within and between 
inequality effects. The decomposition in above allows the assessment of the 
contribution of each member states or demographic groups to the overall inequality. The 
results show that the Theil inequality ranges from a minimum of 0.15 (the Netherlands) 
to a maximum of 0.24 (Portugal) and the average for Euroland has a value of 0.18. The 
between country post (pre) social transfer payments make up a 9 (3) percent of the 
overall inequality and responsible for the overall inequality than the differences between 
household types. They find great disparities within and between the economic situations 
of the different demographic groups across the countries. A common social policy 
should target to reduce the within specific household inequality. An expansion of the 
Union to other members (Greece, the UK and Denmark) increases inequality from 0.18 
to 0.19.  
Heady, Mitrakos and Tsakloglou (2001) in their analysis of the comparative effects of 
social policy on inequality using the European Community household data found 
increasing distributional impacts of transfers and their share of GDP. The extent of 
means testing, the distribution of different funds and the degree of targeting for each 
transfer also affect their effectiveness.  
Economic globalization, domestic politics and income inequality in 14 developed 
countries using LIS data is studied by Mahler (2001). The results show little evidence of 
a systematic relationship between economic globalization and either of the distribution 
of disposable income or the earnings of households. Integration into the world economy 
does not systematically lead to an inegalitarian distribution of income or earnings across 
the entire economies. Politics continues to play a critical role in determining distributive 
outcomes in these countries. Economic globalization is found to be compatible with a 
wide variety of political interactions leading to a wide range of distributive outcomes. 
As mentioned previously Iacoviello (1998) using the LIS data from eight continental 
European countries investigates whether inequality converges to a steady state level of 
inequality during the process of economic growth, the linkage between income and 
inequality movements, factors influencing this growth process, reverse causation from  
Gini coefficient to growth and its consequences concerning the simultaneity bias. 
Results show that shocks to income can yield short run dynamics in the income 
distribution, while the reverse link is not well supported by the LIS data. Quah (1996) 
argue that physical location and geographical spillovers matter more than national 
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macro factors to the observed distribution dynamics across the European regions. 
However, both factors are important for explaining the inequality dynamics. 
In sum several studies analysing the distribution of income among the West European 
countries are based on LIS database. In comparison with other data sources LIS is a 
reliable database for the comparison of welfare states and their social policy. It allows 
comparison at different levels like between and within population sub-groups, between 
and within countries and also over time. Differences in welfare models make the 
countries to differ in their effectiveness in reducing poverty and inequality using taxes 
and income transfer measures. Therefore despite a high degree of homogeneity there are 
still significant variations in the levels of the inequality within and between the different 
population sub-groups and across the West European countries.     
Our results based on the WIID database show that the between country inequality in the 
industrialised countries region is relatively high but the patterns of inequality over time 
is relatively stable. However, there is a negative trend in the mean inequality between 
1955 and 1985 followed by a positive trend post 1985 (see Figure 9). This is valid when 
both population-weighted and unweighted averages are considered. During post 1975 
the inequality is converging in the West European region. The countries differ mainly in 
the distribution where the US tops the list among industrialised countries with a Q5/Q1 
ratio of 9.17, compared to for instance Luxembourg with a low ratio of 2.98 (see 
Section 9 of Tables 3 and 4).  
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Most of the OECD countries are already covered in previous 3 sections. The inclusion 
of a separate section for the OECD countries and label it as a region is simply due to the 
fact that several empirical studies investigates the income distribution among the OECD 
countries a group. Despite the risk of certain level of overlapping a short review of the 
findings in the literature follows.  
Gottschalk and Smeeding (2000) study the income inequality in the OECD. Availability 
of the LIS-data and the improved cross-national comparability has made it possible to 
produce some consistent patterns and provide answers to concerns about the growing 
inequality in income, earnings and wealth amongst the OECD countries. The range of 
income inequality is very wide. Absolute and relative comparisons show a higher level 
of inequality in the US. Income inequality has been steadily increasing in the mid-1980s 
through mid-1990s. The increased inequality in several countries offset the equality 
gains made in the 1960s and 1970s.  
Duro and Esteban (EL 1998) present a decomposition of the Theil index of inequality 
into four components:  
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where the components are productivity per employee worker (), the employment rate 
(), the active over working age population rate (), and the active over total population 
rate (). It is applied to 23 OECD country’s data. The 
 
  is the share of country  in the 
world population and 
 
  per capita income of sub-groups. The results suggest that there 
is a rise in the international inequality between 1960 and 1975 and a decline thereafter 
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until 1989. About one third of the inequality is attributed to factors other than 
productivity differentials. Inequalities in unemployment rates play an increasing role 
indicating a high degree of sensitivity of the local economies to sector-specific chocks. 
The results based on the Penn World Tables and OECD Labour Force Statistics give a 
somewhat different picture than those of Gottschalk and Smeeding. Data sources and 
decomposition of inequality may explain the differences. The factorial decomposition 
proposed by Duro and Esteban is extended by Georlich-Gisbert (2001) and is applied to 
a set of 23 OECD countries for the period 1962-1993. Here instead of population share 
income share is used. All factors are found to contribute significantly to the income 
inequality.  
Real wages and living standards have converged among the OECD countries between 
1850 and 1910. Part of this convergence in real wages and GDP per worker or GDP per 
capita has been due to the mass migration. The mass migration from countries with low 
real wages and low GDP per worker to receiving countries with a higher wages and 
GDP per capita were an important equalising effect on world incomes (Lindert and 
Williamson 2001). Migration barriers, new barriers to trade and capital flow post 1929 
have widened the international income gap. The differences in activity rates, 
unemployment, the working age population and the inequality in productivities affect 
the overall inequality. The overall cross-country inequality is lower within the 23 
OECD countries compared with the worldwide level.  
As mentioned in Duro and Esteban (1998) inequalities in unemployment rates play an 
increasing role indicating a high degree of sensitivity of the local economies to 
specialization in production and the effects of sector-specific chocks. For example the 
negative relationship between wages and unemployment at the regional level within 
Germany is discussed in Pannenberg and Schwarze (2000). The aim is to link inequality 
with the difference in the level of unemployment in the East and West regions of 
Germany. Parikh (2002) examines the interregional labour mobility, inequality and 
wage convergence after the reunification between 16 regions of the East and West 
Germany for the period 1992-1995. The relationship between income inequality and the 
migration of skilled workers did not turn out to be strong.  
The median voter13 will in the more unequal societies relatively be poorer because 
his/her factor gross and disposable incomes are lower in relation to the mean income. 
The more unequal the distribution of income is, if net transfer is positive, the more a 
median voter gains through tax and transfer policy, the more probable he/she votes for 
higher taxes and transfers, and the more unequal societies choose a greater 
redistribution. Given the expectations above Milanovic (2000) study the median voter 
hypothesis, income inequality and income distribution based on the LIS household 
budget survey data. The data covers 24 democracies observed 1 to 7 years in 1980s and 
1990s. The results strongly support the conclusion that countries with a greater 
inequality of the factor income redistribute more to the poor, but it only weakly 
describes the collective choice mechanism. The bottom half receives 19.4 per cent of 
the factor income, while it receives 32.1 per cent of the post taxes and the transfers 
income. The gain of the bottom quintile and bottom half of the factor income 
distribution are 9.75 per cent and 12.44 per cent, respectively. The average Gini 
                                                           
13 Median voter is defined as an individual with the median level of income. For further discussion of 
inequality, median voter hypothesis and redistribution see also Lee and Roemer (1999). 
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coefficient among the 24 countries reduces from 0.46 to 0.32. The reduction in Gini 
coefficient differs by income definition, country and over time. The largest inequality 
reduction is in Belgium (23-28 per cent) and Sweden (20-24 per cent) and the lowest in 
Taiwan (less than 1 per cent). Riphahn (2001) in studying the social assistance take-up 
in Germany shows that more than half of all households eligible for transfers under the 
German social assistance program did not claim their benefits. It seems as in the case of 
the natural rate of unemployment there is a natural rate of poverty that can’t be 
eliminated using transfers. Therefore the possible reductions in the Gini coefficient by 
accounting for non-claimed benefit transfers could be much larger.  
Jäntti (1997) also uses the LIS data to examine levels and trends in the income 
inequality in five OECD countries14 in the 1980s. A number of decomposition methods 
are discussed to decompose the level of income inequality and the changes in the 
income inequality into between and within components by nine income sources15 and a 
number of population groups16. Two methods, the squared coefficient of variation 
( 2 ) and the mean logarithmic deviation (
), are chosen to estimate each 
component’s share in their contribution to the overall inequality, and compare the 
changes across years:   
(8) )/(2 µµρ
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where  is the coefficient of variation, 
 
ρ  is the correlation coefficient between 
population and sub-group income,   and 
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/=  is the population share and 
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=  is the relative income for th sub-group,  and  are sub-group and income 
components. The annualised changes in terms of the percentage changes in each 
component’s contribution calculated. Results show that inequality increased in Sweden, 
the UK and US, but it did not increase in Canada and the Netherlands. Changes are 
mainly associated with the changes in the labour earnings. Increased the inequality of 
head of the household’s earning and the increased share of spouse’s earnings in the 
family income account for much of the observed income inequality. Demographic shifts 
are given a minor role in increasing inequality, while taxes and transfers are responsible 
for a decreasing effect on income inequality. The marginal impacts of various income 
sources on the overall income inequality applied to the US income distribution is also 
analysed by Lerman and Yitzhaki (1985): 
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14 The countries and periods include Canada 1981 and 1987, Netherlands 1983 and 1987, Sweden 1981 
and 1987, UK 1979 and 1986 and USA 1979 and 1986. Income is measured as household disposable 
equivalent income. 
15 The nine income sources are: earnings of head, earnings of spouse, self-employment, property income, 
other private, social insurance, means-tested, income taxes, and payroll taxes.  
16 The population groups are: partitions by family structure (single person, married couple with no 
children, single parent, and married couple with children), by age groups (less than 20, 20-24, 25-29, and 
so on), and by the number of income earners (0, 1, 2, and 3 earners).     
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where each source’s )(  contribution is viewed as the product of the source’s own 
within-group Gini coefficient )(
 
 , its share of the total income )(
 
 , and its 
correlation with the rank of the total income )(
 
ρ . The results indicate that the marginal 
effect of the spouse’s earnings exceeded the marginal effects of the capital income.   
Atkinson (2000) has examined the redistributive impacts of the government budget in 
six OECD countries (the UK, Canada, West Germany, Finland, Sweden and the US) 
over the period from 1980 to the mid-1990s. All countries experienced rise in inequality 
of market income but differed both across countries and over time with regards to the 
distribution of the disposable income. In reviewing the actual government policy 
responses by taking unemployment benefits and personal income taxation as case 
studies, the changes to policy parameters differed in extent and even in direction. 
However, no clear pattern was found in the nature of the relationship between inequality 
and redistribution. Atkinson and Brandolini (2001) compare four secondary data sets on 
income distribution covering the 40s until 70s. A number of OECD countries are used 
to illustrate the impacts of various factors on the outcome of inequality comparison. 
They suggest alternative ways to deal with the differences in the definition across 
countries or across time.  
Results based on the LIS-data with improved cross-national comparability show 
growing income inequality amongst the OECD countries since mid-1980s. The range is 
wide indicating a significant inequality between countries. The redistributive policies in 
form of taxes and transfers have reduced the negative impacts of high unemployment, 
the wage inequality and the within country market income inequality resulting in a more 
equal distribution of the disposable income. Integration of economies, local 
specialization and sector-specific shocks if resulting in persistent unemployment 
increase the inequality among countries and the population sub-groups.  
As previously mentioned results based on the WIID database show that the between 
country inequality in the OECD (labelled as industrialised) countries is relatively high 
but the patterns of inequality over time compared to other regions is less volatile. Many 
studies point to a positive relationship between democracy and equality, but the 
transition experience of the East European countries seems to go against this conclusion 
(Gradstein and Milanovic 2002). There is a negative trend in the mean inequality 
between 1955 and 1985 followed by a positive trend post 1985 (see Figure 9). During 
post 1975 the inequality is converging in the West European region. For detailed 
information on individual countries see Section 9 of Tables 3 and 4.      
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The relationship between inequality and growth or inequality and development is 
studied extensively to quantify the impacts of macroeconomic variables (see Alesina 
and Rodrik 1994; Person and Tabellini 1994). Bourguignon and Morrisson (1998) 
suggest an empirical approach to the relationship between inequality, as observed in 
microeconomic data, and development-related macroeconomic variables. Major 
determinants of country differences in income distribution previously ignored in the 
literature concerning the dualistic nature of developing countries and the nature of the 
agricultural sector. Data from 38 developing countries around 1970s is used by 
Bourguignon and Morrisson for this purpose. Income distribution data comprises 
various combinations of income shares and the determinant variables are GDP per 
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capita, GDP share of agriculture, schooling, exports, income source, cultivated land, and 
the relative labour productivity of agriculture/non-agriculture. The result is robust with 
respect to the composition of the sample, the observation period and the inclusion of 
country-specific fixed effects. The results suggest that the increasing level of 
productivity in agriculture can serve as an important measure to reduce inequality and 
poverty in the developing countries. However, the important role of the growing service 
sector at the cost of agriculture and manufacturing as a source of employment and 
infrastructure for development and equality should not be ignored.  
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Several studies based on income or expenditures calculated from household surveys 
studying the world income distribution show increasing global inequality over time 
driven by the development in Latin America, Eastern Europe and Africa. Africa has 
been a single diverging region when growth, equality and poverty reduction is 
concerned. Svedborg (2002) in his survey of the measurement and results from the 
cross-country income distribution studies points to a number of limitations with Gini 
coefficient and similar measurements. He concludes that the relative differences in 
income between the richest and the poorest countries (located in Africa) have increased 
since the 1960s, but the distribution of income across countries has remained 
unchanged. The initially poorest (African) countries have continued to become more 
impoverished relative to other countries. Their future development will depend on 
economic growth and the relative population growth in the region. Despite its 
importance to the global distribution, it has not been possible to trace relevant studies 
based on household data comparing the income inequality among multiple African 
countries and over time.17 In the absence of such multi-country studies in the following 
briefly we review a number of single country studies. 
The average income per capita in Africa is the lowest among the continents. Milanovic 
and Yitzhaki (2001) find the overall inequality quite high, with the average Gini 
coefficient equal to 52.1 per cent in around 1988 and 1993. The between and within 
country inequality components of the world inequality are 20.3 (39 per cent) and 33.3 
(61 per cent), respectively. The numbers in parentheses are the components’ shares of 
the overall inequality. Unlike the global level and despite the significant heterogeneity 
at the continent level among the 27 African countries studied by Milanovic and 
Yitzhaki, the between country component is relatively low.  
Turning to the individual country level, the extremely high inequality of South Africa 
has often been explained by the racial legacy. Leibbrandt and Woolard (2001) present 
evidence that the between race contribution to inequality has declined from a 
contribution of 62 per cent in 1975 to 33 per cent in 1996, although the within each race 
group inequality widened from 38 per cent in 1975 to 67 per cent in 1996. As shown, 
the empirical results suggest trade off between the between race and the within race 
inequality components. In the decomposition of inequality by income source (Liebrandt, 
Woolard and Woolard 2000) using data from the rural former homelands of South 
                                                           
17 For a comprehensive study of poverty comparisons over time and across countries in Africa, see Sahn 
and Stifel (2000). For empirical analysis various household attributes using demographic and health 
surveys conducted during 1986-1998 covering 12 countries are used in factor analysis to compute a 
wealth index based on assets. The index is used to compare intertemporal and intraregional poverty. The 
results show declines in poverty in the previous decade in rural areas. The improvements are largely due 
to the increased economic openness and removal of distortions that discriminate against rural areas.   
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Africa reveals that wage income is both the most important income component and also 
the most important source of inequality. Policy induced changes to wage income will 
have major impacts on inequality in the rural areas.  
Another empirical picture of the changing racial dimensions of income inequality and 
the changing inequality patterns in South Africa linked to labour market is provided by 
Whiteford and Seventer (2000). They used the Theil index decomposition method to 
decompose the overall inequality into (urban and rural) sectors, different sub-groups, 
and income sources. The racially rigged labour market is the underlying key force 
changing the inequality patterns across and within racial groups. The link between the 
labour market access, the market wage variation and the household inequality is 
investigated. The results suggest the existence of complex patterns of inequality 
generation. It confirms the dominance of labour market in deriving the total inequality 
but finds the contribution of the wage income low and uneven.  
Despite the important role of the labour market and wages, Whiteford and Seventer find 
evidence of a less income mobility between 1993 and 1998 at the top and the bottom of 
the distribution than in the middle for sample of African households in Kwazulu-Natal. 
They attempt to identify the key determinants of this mobility using a series of profiles 
and also a multivariate model of the real income changes. The proposed model explains 
changes in the log household income adjusted for adult equivalent household size by 
asset and the set of characteristics of the economic environment in which households 
are operating. Unemployment and demographic changes are other important variables 
explaining changes in income per adult equivalent. Leibbrandt, Woolard and Woolard 
(2000) find that wage income is an important source driving the inter-household 
inequality and the poverty in the rural former homelands of South Africa. For other 
similar studies decomposing the income inequality by income sources see Lerman and 
Yitzhaki (1985), Haddad and Kanbur (1997), and Jänttio (1997).  
The distribution of earnings in the rural Ghana and Uganda examined by Caragarajah, 
Newman and Bhattamishra (2001) show major differences by gender and types of 
income. The non-farm earnings mainly in form of self-employment income contributes 
to the inequality, but also affects positively the lower income groups earnings. Wage 
income reduces inequality. The inequality impact of self-employment is higher among 
households headed by female. The non-farm sector is an alternative activity to 
agriculture and determinants of the non-farm income are related to location, education, 
age, and the regional characteristics like distance to market. The rural economy in both 
countries is lacking in many basic functional capacities, most notably infrastructure, 
which limits the degree and returns to the rural diversification.  
In sum very few comprehensive multi-country studies of income inequality among the 
sub-Saharan African countries can be found in the inequality literature. The existing 
studies show different patterns in the within and between country inequality 
components compared to those of the global levels. Despite the heterogeneous income 
levels and development among African countries, the within country inequality is much 
higher than the between country component. Even though extreme observations 
probably due to data problem cause a large dispersion in inequality among the countries 
and over time. Several country-level studies point to the importance of racial factor, 
labour market, gender, sectoral and infrastructure to the within country income 
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inequality. In particular the heterogeneous contribution of the different income sources 
to the overall income inequality is emphasized.  
Analysis of the WIID data shows an increasing income inequality among the sub-
Saharan countries. The mean inequality is the highest in Kenya (60.69 per cent) and 
Swaziland (62.30 per cent) and the lowest in Rwanda (28.90 per cent) and Togo (33.80 
per cent). However, these inequality numbers represent extreme cases which are based 
on only 1 or 2 observations. Most African countries are observed only few periods. The 
mean inequality based on more than 10 observations lie in the interval 43.20-60.69 per 
cent indicating a relatively high and stable inequality. The overall mean is 49.26 per 
cent with standard deviation of 10.05 per cent together with a range of inequality up to 
35.99 per cent (Zambia) indicate a relatively high and persistent level of income 
inequality in the region. This is confirmed by the high ratio as well. The sample 
mean  ratio is 8.21. It varies in the interval 4.53 (Niger) and 25.89 (Sierra Leone). 
For more details see Section 6 of Tables 3 and 4 and Figure 6.  
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In analysing poverty and inequality in Latin America and the Caribbean LondoNo and 
Szekely (2000) divide the period 1970-1995 into three stages. The 70s is characterized 
by macroeconomic stability and high growth rates, the 80s by volatility and stagnation, 
while the first half of 90s as a return to more stale environment and positive growth 
rates. Using data covering 13 countries LondoNo and Szekely show that poverty and 
inequality have not declined in the spite of recovery in 1990s. There are differences in 
levels between countries, but inequality and poverty follow similar trends. The 
aggregate inequality and poverty reduced in 70s, deteriorated during the 80s but 
remained high in 90s.  The lower tail of the distribution has not benefited from growth 
indicating lack of a distributive progress. The within country inequality has not been 
stable. The analysis of inequality at the individual level in the region indicates 25% 
excess inequality. Inequality is found to be the source of the lack of progress in poverty 
reduction in the region. Wood (1997) argues that unlike the experience in the East Asia, 
openness to trade has widened the wage inequality in Latin America. Wood suggests 
that the conflict of evidence is probably the result of differences between the 1960s and 
the 1980 (the entry of China into the world market) and the advent of new technology 
biased against unskilled workers, rather than differences between the two regions. 
Wood and Ridao-Caso (1999) analysis of data on 90 countries during 1960-1990 
indicate that a greater openness tends to cause the divergence of level of education and 
enrolment rate between countries.         
Milanovic and Yitzhaki (2001) find the overall global inequality high, with the average 
Gini coefficient equal to 0.555 in around 1988 and 1993. The between and the within 
country inequality components are 0.041 (7 per cent) and 0.514 (93 per cent), 
respectively. Due to the high level of homogeneity among the Latin American countries 
at the continental level, the 19 Latin American countries are distinguished by a very 
high within country inequality. Several countries are identified as potentially unstable 
countries (Gini coefficient exceeding 0.50).  
Since there are not many empirical studies covering multiple of the Latin American 
countries, we rely to a larger extent on single country studies to review the literature on 
the income inequality across Latin America and over time. One such study is by 
Birchenall (2001) who used the Colombian data from 1983 to 1990 to show that the 
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polarisation of income is the variable most strongly and dynamically correlated with 
income inequality and GDP growth. In another study, changes in the shape of the 
Brazilian income distribution during 1981 to 1990 using micro data is examined by 
Cowell, Ferreira and Litchfield (1998). It is shown that the income inequality and the 
average real incomes increased. They examine the difficulties in modelling the shape of 
the income distribution due to the highly skewed nature of the distribution of Brazilian 
income. The results show that inequality in general and amongst the very rich in 
particular increased during the 1980s. A logarithmic transformation of income gave 
satisfactory result. The inequality in Brazil is explained by the differences between 
households of different types, different levels of education, and other spatial differences. 
Changes in inequality over time can be explained by the high rate of inflation.  
In similarity with the sub-Saharan African countries, the Latin American countries also 
are distinguished by a higher within country inequality than the between country 
inequality. The polarisation of income and the high rate of inflation explain the high 
level and the undesirable development of inequality over time in the region. Nine out 
the 26 Latin American countries included in the WIID database have an average 
inequality rate higher than 50 per cent (see Section 5 of Table 3). The mean income 
inequality in the region is 47.39 and a small standard deviation of 7.47. The range is 
quite high, 40.83. Honduras is the most unequal (55.57), while Cuba is the most equal 
(35.06) country in the region. The inequality has increased fastest in Paraguay and the 
 ratio is after Brazil (21.88) the second highest (20.80) ratio. For more details see 
also Section 5 of Table 4. The dispersion in inequality is declining over time indicating 
a process of convergence in inequality. However the convergence is towards a higher 
level of inequality (see Figure 5).    
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As in the case of the African and the Latin American countries, it has not been possible 
to trace studies based on household data comparing income inequality among multiple 
of the East and the South-East Asian countries. In the following we briefly review 
available mainly single country studies. 
Warr (2001) has studied the incidence of poverty and inequality in Thailand using 
household and population data for the period of 1988-1999. The poverty and inequality 
results in a regional perspective indicate that inequality is increased post 1997. There 
was a 21.4 per cent decline in the percentage of poor, from 32.6 per cent to 11.2 per 
cent, prior to the economic crisis of 1997, but the poverty rate again increased during 
the post crisis period to 15.9 per cent in 1999. Inequality is measured by the Gini 
coefficient and the ratio of the highest to the lowest quintile income shares using both 
household and individual as the unit of observation. In the later case Warr accounts for 
the gender and ages of household members to reflect their needs. In comparison with 
the need-based measure, the unweighted household measure underestimates the 
inequality, but the two measures move closely together over time. 
Despite the major reduction in poverty rate, Thailand has failed to reduce the widening 
gaps between individuals, areas and regions predominately the Northern region. 
Droughts in the dry season, the floods in the wet season, lack of support from the 
central government, large sized household, employment patterns, low educational 
attainment, limited access to credit, and inadequate rural-urban linkage are among the 
underlying causes of poverty (Hossain 2001). Hossain focuses on the income poverty 
 22
and inequality in the Northern region and suggests some employment, income and 
equality policy measures to mitigate regional as well as rural-urban disparities in 
Thailand. Cameron (2000b) also finds changes in the income distribution in Java being 
related to the ageing of population, educational attainment and agricultural/industrial 
structure. Unexpectedly, there is little evidence that economic crisis has had a large, 
systematic and negative impact on the well-being of children in Indonesia (Cameron 
2000b).      
Several East Asian economies tried to couple economic growth with reductions in 
poverty and income disparity. The economic crisis of 1997 has deteriorated these 
prospects. Analysis of the relationship between growth, inequality and poverty in nine 
countries in the East Asia and the Pacific region18 is summarised by Kakwani and 
Krongkaew (2000). The individual study results are published in a special issue of the 
Journal of the Asia Pacific Economy 2000, Volume 5(1/2). In the Australian case the 
focus on the taxes and transfers and on the growth rates of the various income 
components rather then on the growth rate of the total income as of the other countries. 
The distribution of income has remained relatively equal in Japan despite the changes in 
the welfare post the World War II. The regional income distribution in Korea has been 
very egalitarian and affected by the domination of the political and the military leaders. 
The increasing development of the income disparity in Taiwan is related to the 
industrial transformation and changes in the factor intensity of production. 
It is widely believed that the East Asian economies performed exceptionally well both 
in generating growth and in keeping income inequality low. You (1998) investigated the 
income distribution in East Asia and found that only Japan, Korea and Taiwan enjoy 
low inequality. However, in general the East Asian countries have been successful in 
translating high profit shares into high savings and investment rates. The high profits 
and the low inequality have resulted in an even distribution of wealth. Bourguignon, 
Fournier and Gurgand (2001) applied a decomposition method to isolate the impact of 
the changes in earnings structure, labour-force participation behaviour, and the socio-
demographic structure of the population on stability of the income distribution in 
Taiwan during 1979-1994. Wage structure, changes in female labour force participation, 
educational structure and changes in composition of household have in different ways 
served both as deriving and off-setting forces to the inequality changes.      
Based on the WIID database, the mean income inequality in the East Asian region is 
quite low, 33.67. It is the highest in Hongkong (44.65) but the lowest in China (29.35). 
Inequality has declined in Mongolia, but it increased in China over time. The mean 
income inequality in the South Asian region is higher than East Asia, 36.94. Inequality 
is the highest in Iran (45.59) but the lowest in Pakistan (34.26). Changes in the 
inequality over time has been the highest in Nepal.  
The mean income inequality in South East Asia and Pacific is much higher that the East 
and the South Asian regions, 43.17, but not when the dispersion in inequality is 
concerned. Inequality is the highest in Malaysia (47.71) and Philippines (46.94). The 
ranking here is based on more than one survey observation and less influenced by 
outliers or measurement errors. The increase in inequality has been the highest in 
                                                           
18 The countries include are advanced industrialised countries (Australia and Japan), newly industrialised 
countries (Korea and Taiwan), low- to middle-income developing countries (China, Indonesia, Malaysia, 
The Philippines and Thailand). 
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Indonesia. The ratio of the highest to the lowest quintiles with the exception of 
Hongkong (9.99) is below 7 in the East and the South Asian countries. However, it 
exceeds 10 in several of the South East Asian and the Pacific countries including Fiji, 
Malaysia and Philippines. For more details on the level and variations in inequality 
across the three regions see Sections 2 to 4 of Table 3 and 4. Inequality in East Asia 
declined prior to 1975 but it increased post 1980, while it declined over time in South 
Asia and South East Asia and Pacific. There is a positive association between the level 
and the variation in inequality. In general dispersion in inequality is declining over time 
indicating a convergence in inequality but to a higher level (see Figures 2 to 5).    

3)	
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Intra-regional inequality refers to disparity in the income distribution within a region 
consisting of a number of countries possibly members of an economic union. The 
poverty and inequality has increased in the transition economies of Central and Eastern 
Europe and the former Soviet Union. The increasing rate is inhomogeneous and might 
be even higher in countries involved in military conflicts. This is in conflict with the 
expected positive relationship between democracy and inequality. Several market 
related determinants of inequality are identified some of which are country specific. The 
role of transitory events and measurement error in the rising inequality should not be 
neglected. The inequality in the Scandinavian countries is low and has been relatively 
stable over time. The Western European countries differ by type of social policy and in 
their effectiveness in reducing poverty and inequality. The high quality data indicates 
opposite development for gross and disposable incomes.  
The between demographic groups within each member country’s inequality is 
significant. The range of income inequality is wide within the OECD. Its development 
has been affected greatly by changes in households, demographic shifts and the labour 
market situation. Individual studies show that inequality is high among the African 
countries. The rate varies among countries by various sub-groups, regional location, 
income sources and over time. The inequality among the Latin American countries also 
is large and increasing over time. The level and patterns has been affected by labour 
market, trade and inflation factors. The East Asian countries have been successful in 
coupling growth and equality. However, the 1997 economic crisis deteriorated these 
prospects. The conflicting results from the two regions are explained by the entry of 
China into the world market and the advent of new technology biased against unskilled 
workers. 
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Table 1. Mean Gini coefficient by country, based on WIID.  
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Table 2. Mean Gini coefficient and quintile share by country, based on WIID.  
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Table 3. Mean Gini coefficient by country, based on WIID.  
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Table 4. Mean Gini coefficient and quintile share by country, based on WIID.  
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Figure 1. Development of Gini coefficient, Middle East and North Africa.
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
1945 1950 1955 1960 1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000
Period
G
in
i c
oe
ffi
ci
en
t Minimum
Mean
Median
Maximum
Std Dev
Weighted
Figure 2. Development of Gini coefficient, East Asia.
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Figure 3. Development of Gini coefficient, South East Asia and Pacific.
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Figure 4. Development of Gini coefficient, South Asia.
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Figure 5. Development of Gini coefficient, Latin America.
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Figure 6. Development of Gini coefficient, Sub-Saharan Africa.
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Figure 7. Development of gini coefficient, East Europe.
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Figure 8.  Development of Gini coefficient, Former Soviet Republics.
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Figure 9. Development of Gini coefficient, Industrialized countries.
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Figure 10. Trend in mean unweighted gini coefficient by region.
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